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griculture is the economic activity that still provides a livelihood for the
majority of people, especially the poor.  Every effort thus needs to be
made towards making this sector more productive and able to sustain a better quality
of life for those who remain dependent on agriculture as a livelihood while also
indirectly contributing to improved welfare among the remainder of the population.
This understanding has not always been the driving force behind policymaking.  It
took the Uruguay Round to start mainstreaming agricultural trade into the multilateral
trading system under the World Trade Organization in 1995.  Although a latecomer,
agriculture is now at centre stage of the Doha Development Agenda negotiations and,
in the view of many, is holding the Doha Round captive as it prevents agreements in
other areas of negotiations until members concur on agricultural trade liberalization.
Meanwhile, despite Uruguay round liberalization, agriculture remains the most
distorted sector due to the heavy use of trade barriers and support policies (for both
domestic production and exports).  Most nations still seek “windows of exception” for
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their agricultural sector, be it for the use of trade barriers or support policies.  Since all
such instruments distort the relative prices of agricultural products vis-à-vis other
products, they affect every country’s overall economy and its sectors differently,
depending on production and consumption patterns.  However, multilateral
negotiations so far have focused considerably more on one distorting instrument,
export subsidies, thus resulting in much less progress in freeing trade in agriculture
and removing other support for domestic agricultural production.  This paper argues
that this focus might have been misdirected, given the available evidence of sources of
welfare effects in agricultural trade liberalization efforts.  It is time to start closing
windows of exception for some and start opening windows of opportunity for all.
Irrespective of how (and when) the Doha Round will close, other important
aspects of trade liberalization in agriculture are explored in this paper.  One aspect is
a process of increased reliance on less transparent instruments of protection.  It
appears that trade in agriculture follows the same trade path as that followed with
industrial goods during the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) era; with
a reduction in import tariffs and quotas, there was a clear increase in the use of
non-tariff and non-border barriers (such as quality standards, safety standards and
rules of origin).  This paper comments on some instruments that have the potential to
be used for non-tariff protection, i.e., geographical indications and food safety
standards.  While these have already been used extensively by some trading nations,
many others (particularly developing countries) have failed to see how they could
significantly contribute to development.  This, however, does not in general apply to
the use of food and agricultural product safety standards.  It is true that these can be
used as (effective) trade barriers.  However, with some proactive strategic thinking,
these standards could be transformed into incentives for economy-wide positive
changes in the production of food.  Coupled with the adaptation of modernized
regulatory systems, this would become a driver of increase competitiveness in both
domestic and export markets.
Another aspect of agricultural trade liberalization is preferential liberalization
through bilateral or regional trade agreements.  The Asian and Pacific region is
a fertile breeding ground for new agreements of this type, with almost 100 of them
now in force or being negotiated that include at least one member of ESCAP.  ESCAP
has developed a database for tracking and (ultimately) assessing the performance of
these preferential trade agreements.  It can be used in gaining a better understanding
of the treatment of any particular sector, including agriculture, in the preferential
agreements as well as the contribution of the design of such agreements to their
performance.  The database is also considered helpful to policymakers in their
management of multilateral, preferential and autonomous liberalization.
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1. INTRODUCTION1
Agriculture is the economic activity that still provides a livelihood for the majority
of people, especially the poor.  Every effort thus needs to be made towards making this
sector more productive and able to sustain a better quality of life for the people working in
it as well as indirectly contributing to improved welfare among the remainder of the
population.  This understanding has not always been accepted.  During a major part of the
twentieth century, in many developing countries, it was strongly held that agriculture and
modern development were mutually exclusive and policy attention was given to
industrialization.  This extended to a diminishing contribution of trade in agricultural
products to development; therefore, developing countries did not demand that agricultural
products be included in the multilateral trading system during the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) era.
At the same time, in many developed countries, the agricultural sector was already
the smallest in terms of GDP and employment generation.  In most European countries,
what was left of the agricultural sector was in need of special attention by protectionist
trade policies and domestic support.  Starting with the political reasons for reconstructing
long-term peace in Europe after the Second World War, “meddling” in agricultural
production and trade continued for such reasons, as providing food security, protecting the
farming community from natural and man-made shocks, preserving “rural life”, protecting
the environment, or simply owing to the pressure of strong farmers’ lobbies.  Ultimately,
agriculture became the most distorted sector, hurting the poor who depend on agricultural
production, mostly in developing countries.
After the Uruguay Round, agriculture made a comeback in development strategies.
It was “mainstreamed” into the multilateral trading system under the World Trade
Organization (WTO) through implementation of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) of the
Uruguay Round for developed country members by the year 2000, and for developing
members by 2005.  AoA required members to translate all existing border measures
other than customary customs duties (annex 5, paragraph 6) on agricultural products into
so-called equivalent tariffs (a process known as “tariffication”).  The idea behind this was to
introduce the same measurement standard for the level of protection that prevailed in
agricultural trade, this standard being an equivalent tariff.  By binding the equivalent tariffs,
benchmarks were introduced against which all members would have been assessed and, in
relation to which, further liberalization following a predetermined timetable would have
been undertaken.
1 “Issues of Interest in WTO for Countries with Economies in Transition:  Doha Development Agenda” was
recently published in this Review (vol. 1, No. 2, November 2005).  It covers extensively issues of agricultural
trade negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda, particularly those relevant to ESCAP members and
associate members.  The present paper makes use of that text but does not repeat its content unless doing so
cannot be avoided.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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In the implementation of this agreement, members managed to bind their tariffs at
very high levels, known as “dirty tariffication”, making further liberalization efforts more
difficult, as seen so far during the current round of negotiations (see table 1).  To achieve
any actual liberalization, cuts in bound rates must be deep; in fact, they must be much
deeper than most members are ready to accept.
Table 1.  Comparison of bound and applied tariffs: import-weighted average




Developed 27 22 14
Developing 48 27 21
Least developed 78 14 13
World 37 24 17
Source: Jean, S., D. Laborde and W. Martin, 2006. “Consequences of alternative formulas for agricultural
tariff cuts”, in K. Anderson and W. Martin, eds., Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Round
(Hampshire, United Kingdom, Palgrave Macmillan).
Note: Figures for regions are computed as import-weighted averages across countries.
Despite the obvious distortions caused by interventionist policies in the
agricultural sector, Governments still maintain that the agricultural sector requires and
deserves “windows of exception” when it comes to streamlining measures that distort
agricultural trade.2 In many instances, Governments have not been willing to separate
objectives that belong to domestic policies3 from those that are under the auspices of trade
policy.  Corden (1974) showed a long time ago that using trade policy for non-trade
objectives is far more costly and less effective than using policies which can target chosen
objectives directly (the so-called “specificity rule”).  The Governments of both developing
and developed countries appear to have no problems with the obvious inefficiency in using
social resources when attempting to solve environmental, employment or other non-trade
problems by relying only or mostly on trade policies.
Among the instruments of trade policies, Governments use mostly tariffs
(in particular, per unit or specific tariffs), quantitative border barriers and export subsidies.
2 The phrase is taken from a statement of the former Commerce Minister of the Government of India, Mr. Arun
Jaitley, quoted in Deardorff and Stern (2004), p. 11, “We do not wish to stall the negotiations on agriculture,
but we hope adequate windows of exception for economies like India that are highly dependent on agriculture,
are created”.
3 For example, food security, a safety net for the poor, addressing the risks and returns in farming faced by small
and marginal farmers, or rural development.  See also Srinivasan (2003).Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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Additionally there are measures of domestic support (linked to production) that can be used
in combination with other non-trade policies in creating shelter for the domestic economy
or more often only selected parts of it.  Most recent quantitative analyses show that, out of
the measures that Governments have been using to intervene in agricultural sectors, market
access measures (i.e., tariffs) have had the strongest impact, while domestic support and
export subsidies were associated with less distortion (Hertel and Keeney, 2006).
The effects of protection are well known from theory as well as the experience of
the many countries practising it:  raised domestic prices of agricultural products,
particularly food; depressed world prices of agricultural products; distorted signals for
resource allocation and entrenchments of resources in inefficient uses, making it difficult
for Governments to eliminate protection.  Without the removal or significant weakening of
this protection, trade cannot make production more efficient and competitive nor can it
attract trade-creating and welfare-increasing investment.  Without these actions, it is close
to impossible to increase prosperity over the long term.
This paper looks at several selected issues related to agricultural trade
liberalization.  At the outset, the achievements resulting from the Sixth Ministerial
Conference of WTO, held in Hong Kong, China, from 13 to 18 December 2005, in relation
to the agricultural negotiations, are highlighted.  This section then discusses the fallacies
and misdirected priorities of the Doha Development Agenda, which arguably have focused
only on some of the (needed) disciplines in agricultural trade.  It also looks at the role of
building coalitions in bringing the negotiations to a successful closure.  Section 3 leaves the
area of negotiations to explore how traditional “hard” protectionist measures in agricultural
trade (e.g., quotas, tariffs, explicit subsidies) are being replaced by “soft” measures that,
nevertheless, contain very sharp teeth for occasions when tougher action is desired.  In the
fourth section, the preferential trade liberalization in agriculture from the perspective of the
Asian and Pacific region is reviewed and the work of ESCAP on the database for
preferential trade agreements is described.  The final section of the paper offers some
concluding thoughts.
2. CURRENT STATE OF PLAY
Long before the unplanned loud and colourful start to the previously mentioned
Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference, it was clear that yet again agricultural trade
negotiations were proving very unpalatable to the taste of many stakeholders.  Agriculture
indeed turned into such a tension-generating agenda item that some senior trade negotiators
were heard saying that agriculture should have never have been placed under the
GATT/WTO “coverage”.  In their view, not only has agriculture itself proven difficult to
liberalize in trade and to liberate from non-economic objectives, it has paved the way for
other negotiating areas to enter into the multilateral system that are similarly hard to mold
into the consensus-based decision-making of that system.  Nonetheless, agriculture wasAsia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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given the central role in the Sixth Ministerial Conference when many members confirmed
that they would consider it a “make-or-break” issue.  In the end, as discussed in ESCAP
(2006), it was not agriculture that kept the agenda of the Ministerial Conference and the
Doha Development Agenda on the rails; it was, in fact, the collective understanding that
derailing the round would probably be too costly for any country individually and for the
global economy as a whole.
(a) The Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, China – “Kicking the can
down the road”4
As expected, the Sixth Ministerial Conference did not result in any surprises.  With
respect to agriculture, progress was made in all three pillars:  market access, domestic
support and export competition.  New elements in the Declaration of that Conference
included the following:
O Market access – the formalization of a “working hypothesis” on structuring
tariffs for reductions within four tiers, with steeper cuts on higher tariffs but
no further details on the formula.  The key principles for constructing the
formula should be:  (i) a single approach (excluding only least-developed
countries); (ii) reductions in bound rates; (iii) “operationally effective”
special treatment for developing countries; and (iv) allowing all countries
flexibility in protecting “sensitive products”;
O Domestic support – confirmation of the “working hypothesis” that the
aggregate measure of support would be classified into three bands.  The
European Union will occupy the top band facing the highest linear tariff cuts,
the United States of America and Japan will be placed in the middle band and
the remaining members listed in the bottom band.  The text also specifies that
overall cuts in trade-distorting domestic support must be at least equal to or
greater than the sum of the reductions in the amber box, blue box and de
minimis (exempted) support;5
O Export competition – the Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 18 December
2005, announced parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies and
disciplines for all export measures with equivalent effect by the end of 2013
together with progressive phasing-out such that a substantial part would be
realized by the end of the first half of the implementation period.  This means
that 2013 will mark the end of agricultural export subsidies, export credits,
4 The phrase “kicking the can down the road” is borrowed from Heydon (2006, p. 5), who attributes it to
a United States senator.  Emphasis has been added by the author.
5 This should act as a deterrent to simple reclassification of subsidies from one box to another in order to escape
meeting commitments.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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export credit guarantees or insurance programmes, activities of State-trading
enterprises that are deemed subsidized and food aid that does not conform to
various disciplines.  It also refers to an end to all export subsidies for cotton
by developed countries in 2006.6
It is also important to note that paragraph 24 of the Ministerial Declaration links
market access ambitions in agricultural and non-agricultural market access.
(b) Coalitions – who is kicking harder and in which direction?
To decipher what is going on in or with agricultural negotiations, it is highly
relevant to be aware of the major players and groupings actively cooperating in the
negotiations.  The Asian and Pacific region is not represented by a single group or coalition
speaking with one voice in WTO on agricultural trade issues.  The region includes least
developed countries (LDCs), small and vulnerable economies, developing countries that are
net food importers and net food exporters, and developed economies.  These countries
opted to form alliances in the Cairns Group, Group of Twenty, Group of Ten, Group of
Thirty-three, Group of One Hundred and Ten,7 and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
countries, and small and vulnerable economies (SVEs).  The only group that has not
recruited any members from the ESCAP region is the Tropical Product Group (figure 1).
Several countries (Australia, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives and New Zealand) belong only to
one group (Cairns, G-10, and SVEs).  Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand are the most
active, with alliances in three groups:  Cairns, G-33 and G-20.  The global South-South
divide is quite noticeable, with the Cairns Group, representing the interests of net food
exporters (including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand from developing
countries, and Australia and New Zealand from the developed countries) being at one end
of the spectrum in terms of negotiating positions and the net food-importing countries,
which seem not to be formally linked to any groupings, at the other end.
To compensate for these wedge-inserting groups, there are ad hoc alliances called
consensus builders.  In agricultural negotiations in this trade round, these alliances were
noticeable when the European Union and the United States first came up with a joint
proposal in 2003, and again when the Five Interested Parties, that is, the United States, the
European Union, India, Brazil and Australia, formulated the 2004 July Framework.  The
so-called New Quad that emerged at the Ministerial Conference, comprising the European
6 The Declaration also calls for faster and deeper reductions in trade-distorting domestic subsidies for cotton
than those that will be achieved through general schedules for domestic support to farming.
7 The G 110 is associated with a meeting of G 20, G 33 and G 90 (64 of which are WTO members) at the Sixth
Ministerial Conference.  There is another group indirectly linked to agricultural liberalization, even though not
involved in the AoA negotiations.  It is related to negotiations on geographical indications (GIs) within the
Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights and they are known as “Friends of GIs”.  Members
from the ESCAP region are India, Thailand and Turkey.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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Union, the United States, India and Brazil, is still the strongest force keeping this part of the
negotiations rolling.
The question is whether developing countries of the Asian and Pacific region,
including India and China, could or should make more of an impact by trying to form
a regional alliance.  With the region being so diverse, it is difficult to see what would be the
unifying common interest for such a coalition.  Net exporters (Cairns Group) stand to
benefit from liberalization.  Their interests cannot be supported by net food importers and
other countries with problems related to accessing world markets, at least as long as there is
no instrument of redistribution of gains from trade.  The need to introduce a comprehensive
and operational compensation package for trade reform (or trade adjustment package) may
be one area of possible common interest.  While the Uruguay round included a decision to
provide financial and other assistance to LDCs and net food-importing (developing)
countries, the decision was never implemented.  With some countries already having some
experience in designing a compensatory package for trade adjustment, notably for loss of
tariff revenue at the preferential trade liberalization level within the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation, it is plausible for this initiative to be taken up by
Figure 1.  Coalitions on agricultural trade negotiationsAsia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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other developing countries in Asia and the Pacific.  It could provide a unifying force for
furthering regional cooperation/integration and could perhaps be extended to multilateral
negotiations (see Dhar, 2005).  It does not have to be limited to agricultural trade, but can
be cross-cutting through the Doha Development Agenda.8
(c) Is the can being kicked off the road?
The most noticeable development in the area of agricultural negotiations in the
aftermath of the Ministerial Conference was the issuance of a “list of questions” by
Mr. Crawford Falconer, Chairman of the WTO Committee on Agriculture.  In sending the
list to the members’ delegations, he wanted to “underline …that we have a huge amount of
work to do” (WTO, 2006).  This could not be closer to the truth.
Delegations are faced with the extremely difficult task of agreeing on, for
example, relevant liberalization thresholds for developed and developing members, the
treatment of sensitive products, special products for developing countries, the special
safeguard mechanism, disciplines for “food for aid” as well as export subsidies, export
credit, State trading enterprises and some additional details on cotton.  For some of these
there is no precedent or experience based on previous WTO-enforced disciplines (e.g.,
subsidy elements of export credits and guarantees or financing for food aid).  Without
a doubt, it will be close to a miracle if results can be delivered on agriculture and, in turn,
almost certainly on other items of the Doha Development Agenda, with non-agricultural
market access, services, trade facilitation and development aspects of all of these areas
being the most important.  What would facilitate this outcome? As decision-making in
WTO is based on consensus, it is of the utmost importance that all involved understand all
the concerns.  It is also essential that free riding is either eliminated or minimized so that all
members take an active role in closing the deal.  After all, everyone will be involved in
sharing the costs and benefits of the agreed liberalization, even if some will gain a bigger
share than others.
8 Although not from the Asian and Pacific region, another good example of possible coalition-building is the
“Uruguay round ceiling tariff issue” request by a small group of developing countries led by Kenya.  On the
other hand, there are also strong separatist forces most strongly linked to a debate on the erosion of
preferences.  However, erosion is not stopable if there is trust in the multilateral trading system, as any
progress on the most-favoured-nation front will automatically have implications for other preferences.  In the
long term, developing countries are better off with a free(er) multilateral regime than with maintaining high
non-reciprocal preferences, as the usefulness of the latter for development could be questioned.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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3. FALLACIES AND PRIORITIES9
Unfortunately, a clear understanding of all the concerns cannot always be
achieved.  An increasing number of stakeholders involved in the preparation of negotiations
and the process of negotiations is adhering to the principles of inclusiveness and
transparency.  However, this does not necessarily or automatically produce the same
understanding of the problems among all the interested parties.  In what follows, we briefly
discuss how the lack or misinterpretation of information could lead to the negotiations
becoming stalled.
Preparations for the Ministerial Conference were accompanied by a stream of
academic and other publications containing, inter alia, quantitative estimations of the
impacts that various Doha Development Agenda scenarios would have had in terms of
welfare in individual countries or groups of countries.  While this was well intended, it
could backfire as it did just at the time of Sixth Ministerial Conference, with the estimates
of the overall monetary gains from the Doha Development Agenda.  This paper provides
a brief tour d’horizon of the issues associated with the quantitative studies currently
available.10 Basically, there are two problems with quantitative analysis of (multilateral)
trade liberalization.  The first is related to models that most empiricists use and the fact that
numerical findings obtained by these models are often knowingly or unintentionally
misinterpreted and misused.  The second problem occurs due to less-than-acceptable data
quality and reliability as well as from data and other quantitative information (including
results of quantitative analyses) being wrongly interpreted and used.  Let us discuss, albeit
in simplistic terms, each of these in turn.
(a)  Models for quantitative analysis – making a choice
As discussed in Piermartini and Teh (2005), while quantification of the effects of
economic policies has become an ordinary approach in economic analysis due to advances
in theory and computational and data-processing capacities, the variability of models used
to capture the impacts of policies has remained somewhat narrow.  Most commonly used
quantitative analytical techniques in the area of trade are computable general equilibrium
(CGE) and gravity models.  CGE models are economists’ laboratories in which they can run
computer-based simulations of “real economy” replicas.  In the area of trade, these models
are used mostly to estimate the effects of changes in different policies (such as trade
liberalization) throughout an economy.  This “general equilibrium” nature of CGE models
is most valuable because it reflects the interdependency of economic variables.
Policymakers can verify from the model of what they know by intuition or from experience,
9 Inspiration for this subsection title comes from Rae and Shakur (2005).
10 Readers who prefer a more technical approach to this problem are referred to Hertel and Keeney (2006) or
Keeney and Hertel (2005).Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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that is, they cannot give more to one group if they do not take away from another group,
ceteris paribus.  It is this feature of the model that makes it instructional and helpful when
choosing from different policy options.
However, as is the case with all economic models, CGE models are based on sets
of restrictive assumptions that make them “easy to use” but also less like the “real thing”,
i.e., a living complex economy.  Because of high degrees of aggregation in most of these
models, it is quite possible that many important underlying links remain hidden.  The other
complexities related to the specifications of models, data availability and reliability, lack of
attention given to alternative assumptions as well as a host of other issues is such that these
models should be labelled “use with utmost care”.  Anything less would be irresponsible.
At best, the numerical results obtained when using CGE models can be used as reference
points for the order of magnitude of potential effects if the world does not change
significantly in the period of analysis.  Most modellers and economic analysts are well
aware of these caveats and use them with care and responsibility.  On the other hand, others
(e.g., policymakers, civil society, bureaucrats and parliamentarians) who obtain these results
may not be aware of the “use with utmost care” label.  Too often, the results of CGE
analysis are misinterpreted and they could be intentionally used to misrepresent the
outcome of a policy change that is analysed.
The gravity model has become a very fashionable tool for quantitative analysis in
the field of trade.  While the model has been around for several decades, it is the surge in
preferential trade agreements that has really boosted its use.  The model is used to measure
and explain the effects on trade flows of a policy that has already taken effect, and not for
questions related to the implementation of new policies (such as changes in tariff structure).
However, the results can still be used as inputs in future policymaking as “past policy
impacts may serve to understand the implications of a change in future policy” (Piermartini
and Teh, 2005).  In other words, as laymen would say, one should learn from somebody
else’s mistakes.  A particular problem with such models is that so far in explaining trade
between two countries (even WTO members) there is no variable to reflect their
commitments in multilateral liberalization.  A more basic problem comes from using
unweighted distance as a proxy for trade costs (and/or transport costs).  However, it should
be obvious that the cost of cargo being transported a certain distance across the European
continent between, for example, Zagreb in Croatia and Luxemburg will be very different
from that for the same type of cargo being transported the same distance across the African
continent between, for example, Yaoundé in Cameroon and Bangui in Central African
Republic.
This and other more specific problems aside, it is still unlikely that numbers
obtained by either type of models will be replicated in the real world.  According to DeRosa
and Gilbert (2005), the CGE models used to predict Uruguay round gains proved to have
underpredicted gains.  In contrast, gravity models tend to overestimate gains, particularlyAsia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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those of some preferential trade agreements.  The bottom line is that better models and
better data are needed.  In the meantime, as is often the case in economic policy, a rule of
thumb should be applied.  When it comes to trade liberalization, there is no doubt that the
thumb (even if the hand is invisible!) points towards more liberal trade for all.
(b) Data
Another problem with using quantitative analysis is the availability of data in
a multilateral context.  Many countries do not have complete or reliable data series.  In
addition, in some cases, data are misinterpreted and misused even if they are not used as
inputs in further quantitative analysis.  For example, Panagariya (2005) and Anderson and
others (2005) commented on misinterpreting Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) measures of producer-support estimates as “export subsidies”.  Such
misrepresentation of results leads to the creation of fallacies and, from there, to the choice
of the wrong priorities for negotiating agenda.  An example is that the focus given by using
wrong estimates for subsidies drove many WTO members into prioritizing negotiations in
the area of agricultural export subsidies.  However, empirical findings on the contribution to
economic welfare of agricultural trade liberalization are converging towards a conclusion
that, at the global level, the removal of export subsidies gives the smallest share of increases
in welfare (around 2 per cent).  Furthermore, removal of export subsidies has a negative
impact on non-OECD countries that is compensated for by the positive impact of improving
import access.  The removal of domestic support measures, according to these findings, is
more than twice as good as the elimination of export subsidies (5 per cent of the total
increase in welfare).  The removal of barriers to market access is what drives the increase in
welfare, with the contribution being 93 per cent.11
Given the fragility of quantitative assessments in the field of trade, it is extremely
important that findings are interpreted correctly and used in the proper context.  If this is not
practised by all, it is easy to hijack some of the results for the interest of specific groups.
Identification of the right source of positive change in welfare is crucial to the identification
of viable negotiating positions for particular groups.12
11 According to Will Martin, market access barriers are the key in agricultural trade liberalization as “deep
reductions in agricultural tariffs would deliver twelve times the gains that would be achieved by abolishing
export subsidies and trade-distorting domestic support to agriculture.” See <http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20716308~menuPK:51062077~pagePK:34370~
piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html>.
12 The largest culprit in the area of using agricultural export subsidies has been the European Union.  In the Doha
Development Agenda, the European Union agreed to eliminate the use of this instrument and even accepted
the date (2013) by which to do so.  It appears that the European Union had been reducing these subsidies since
2000 and that it would have continued doing so unilaterally.  As Hoekman and Messerlin (2006, p. 197) state:
“…the European Union may be selling rapidly depreciating ‘assets’.”Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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4. SIDE EFFECTS OF THE WTO NEGOTIATIONS:  FUZZIER
PROTECTION
Sequential rounds of multilateral trade liberalization have been followed by the
emergence of new border and non-border barriers in an effort by Governments to replace
lost protection due to the reduction and elimination of tariffs and quotas.  These new
barriers appear to be less transparent13 than traditional hard border barriers, i.e., tariffs and
quantitative restrictions.  Most such barriers are hidden as customs procedures and
administrative practices, special charges and taxes, restrictive practices and technical
barriers to trade.  In agricultural trade, technical barriers to trade are becoming increasingly
prevalent.  Stringent policy measures through sanitary regulations and quality standards,
safety and industrial standards have become the norm rather than the exception.  In the
context of non-reciprocal or reciprocal preferential trade, rules of origin can also easily be
used to obscure protectionist practices by the importing country.
In view of the evident ease with which “bird flu” as well as similar potentially
very serious human illnesses can spread, no one would argue in favour of a total ban on
sanitary and other related measures, which are meant to protect public health.  What is
arguable, however, is the stringency of the measures.  If the social marginal benefit to
public health from an additional measure (or the toughening of an existing one) is not
greater than the social marginal cost resulting from such a measure through the reduction of
competition and efficiency, then the change is not justified.  It does not mean that it will not
be adopted, but at least the public deserves to know the cost of such a change.
This paper, being a brief overview of several issues, cannot go into a comprehensive
analysis of the various soft barriers.  However, two areas are worth further comment.  One
is related to geographical indications, and the other to food safety requirements.
(a)  Geographical indications
Geographical indications, or “GIs” as they are often referred to, “identify a good
as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where
a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its
geographical origin” (Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs),
article 22.1).  These mainly comprise place names used to identify products that originate
from those places and which have these characteristics (e.g., “Champagne”, “Madeira” and
“Basmati”).  Two articles in the TRIPs Agreement define protection in relation to
geographical indications.  Article 22 covers all products by defining a standard level of
protection.  This standard requires that geographical indications must be protected for the
13 They also appear harder to manage in the multilateral negotiating forum as many instruments tend to be
labelled as “domestic regulation”.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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benefit of the public, as well as to ensure fair competition.  Article 23 provides a higher or
enhanced level of protection for geographical indications for wines and spirits.  Exceptions
contained in article 24 allow for no or limited protection in cases where a name has become
the common (“generic”) term (e.g., “cheddar”) and when a term has already been registered
as a trademark.  The Doha Development Agenda focused on two additional issues of
a higher level of protection:  the creation of a multilateral register for wines and spirits and
the extension of the higher level of protection beyond wines and spirits.
WTO members differ with respect to the ways that they implement and monitor
the geographical indications.  The European Union has the “Register of protected
designations of origin and protected geographical indications”.  In November 2005, the
European Commission added the names of six agricultural products and foodstuffs to the
Register.  These included French, Italian and Spanish products (such as “pâtes d’Alsace” or
“jamón de Trevélez”).  The list contains about 720 product names already protected under
the legislation on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin and
traditional speciality, which is the third category of rules on agricultural quality products
under name “traditional speciality guaranteed”.  The United States has a less stringent
system known as “certification marks”.
While every country should have an opportunity to secure the best quality of food
and other agricultural items for its society, this should not be done at the expense of other
societies.  Geographical indications have the same effect as escalating tariffs because they
tend to lock in the producers outside the “protected” territory into the lower stages of
production and effectively ban entrance into the processing stage.  In some cases, this could
be justified by the resource endowments and technological capacity of a country; however,
in many cases, this is just another barrier to prevent a lower cost producer from entering the
market with a similar product.14 New proposals to extend geographical indications are still
being debated, with both pro- and anti-camps strongly pushing their points of view.
(b) Food safety standards
There is much evidence that food safety and agricultural health standards are
becoming increasingly challenging for developing country exporters when trying to access
international markets for high-value food products (fruit, vegetables, fish, meat, nuts and
spices).  This is best evidenced through dispute settlement cases in WTO.  Much of the
related literature also confirms that sanitary and phytosanitary standards could be used as
a barrier to trade because of their disguised discriminatory effect and because of the high
14 Perhaps the case of “feta” cheese could be used as an example.  There is also a claim that geographical
indications drive up product (export) values, benefiting producers from price premiums because of the
growing demand for “genuine” products.  However, this increased profit argument does not sit well with the
original argument for introducing geographical indications.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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cost of compliance.  However, there is also a “silver lining”, as the many developing
countries imposing sanitary and phytosanitary standards on producers and exporters provide
an incentive for economy- and system-wide changes.  These changes include modernization
of production and regulation as well as the adoption of safer and more sustainable
production practices (Jaffe, 2005).
The World Bank (2005) found that the adoption of a strategic approach to food
safety, agricultural health and trade was the best long-term option for developing countries
in meeting the challenges of standards of all types.  It is argued that for countries and
suppliers that are ready to follow this approach, more stringent standards of food safety and
health would represent new opportunities rather than obstacles.  However, producers and
exporters in many developing countries and LDCs find that compliance with these
standards makes it impossible for them to compete in the market they want to access.
Rather than adopting different standards for them, it would be more in line with
a development-oriented round to increase development flows (“aid for trade” included) to
such countries in order to build up their capacities to cope with increasing levels of food
safety standards.
In the above connection, work also needs to be done in the area of standard setting.
So far, developing countries have not contributed substantially to international standard-
setting bodies or other agencies that influence the level and character of standards in terms
of participation or direction.  Here, the focus should not be on readjustment of standards to
a lower or the lowest common denominator.  Rather, it should be on facilitating the use of
practices and procedures that support the adoption of high(er) standards everywhere as long
as an increase in standard level is socially justified.  A related phenomenon emerging in this
area is the increasing role of private standards that are beyond public control yet seem to be
governing international and national trade in food items.  It has been reported that standards
are imposed on producers from developing countries with requirements exceeding
public regulations, especially regarding production processes, certification and traceability
(see, for example, Bureau and others, 2005).  This practice makes the demands of
distributors in developed countries excessively stringent and reduces the cost-effectiveness
of the developing country producers.
5. AGRICULTURE IN REGIONAL PREFERENTIAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS
At a recent World Bank conference, it was claimed that “WTO, particularly for
agricultural liberalization, is more or less the only game in town”.  It has also been claimed
that “very few so-called free trade agreements are really about freeing trade or creating new
trading opportunities” and that they are also very weak in introducing and enforcing
discipline that is the trademark of multilateral liberalization (Lamy, 2006).Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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A cursory glimpse at the map of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) (see figure 2)
shows that this lack of liberalization and discipline dimensions has not prevented
Governments in the region from promoting entry into various types of preferential trade
agreements.  At last count, there were close to 100 preferential trade agreements with at
least one member coming from the membership of ESCAP.  Most of them are shallow
free-trade-area type arrangements, but which venture into non-trade areas of cooperation
and integration.  Many are also still on their way to satisfying WTO compliance
requirements.  While the academic literature has formed views on various important issues
with respect to preferential liberalization, not much progress has been achieved in empirical
testing of PTAs in Asia and the Pacific with regard to these issues.
For example, while the academic literature has a great deal to say on the
advantages of deeper versus shallow integration, too little is understood about this area in
the context of Asian and Pacific PTAs.  There is also insufficient understanding of the
treatment of particular sectors, including agriculture, in these PTAs.  Even less can be said
about the possible long-term contribution of PTA-driven liberalization to freer trade
globally.
To improve understanding of the above issues, the Asia-Pacific Research and
Training Network on Trade (ARTNeT) included a study on regional agricultural trade
liberalization in its 2005 research programme.15 The findings of this project will be
available later in 2006.  However, preliminary results show that, in contrast to WTO
disciplines that embrace these pillars, PTAs as a rule focus on liberalizing only one of them,
i.e., market access.  This is indeed movement in the right direction if we are to rely on
quantitative estimates; it is market access that provides the greatest contribution to increases
in welfare following multilateral liberalization.  Thus far, we have yet to discover PTAs in
the region that deal with the export subsidies and domestic support disciplines in agriculture
as effectively as in multilateral agreements.  Because a large proportion of these agreements
belong to the South-South type, most of them also include significant exclusions in the form
of sensitive products and positive lists.  However, in contrast to proposals for tariff cuts in
the Doha Development Agenda, with preferential trade, market access is freed through cuts
in applied tariff rates, which is also the only sensible direction to take.  As expected, the
agreements do contain safeguards and sanitary and phytosanitary standards, but not beyond
the level of that found in WTO provisions.  Similar to multilateral agreements, PTAs at this
shallow level also do not negotiate on non-tariff measures.
(a) Asia-Pacific preferential trade and investment agreements database16
In addition to being actively engaged in research on trade liberalization, both
multilateral and preferential, of and within national economies, the ESCAP secretariat is
15 More details can be found at <www.artnetontrade.org>.
16 This section is based on Bonapace and Mikic, 2006.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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Figure 2.  From spaghetti bowl to noodles:  main regional integration arrangements
of ESCAP members and associate members
Source: ESCAP secretariat.
Notes: ANZCERTA – Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement; APEC –
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation; APTA – Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement; ASEAN – Association of South-East
Asian Nations; BIMST-EC – Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation;
CAEU – Central Asian Economic Union; ECOTA – Economic Cooperation Organization Trade Agreement; EEC –
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developing a “one-stop” database that collates descriptive and quantitative information on
more than 80 RTAs/bilateral trade agreements (BTAs) applicable to the region.  The
objective is to provide stakeholders (Governments, researchers, policy analysts and civil
society) with a tool to monitor and analyse developments in preferential trade areas.  The
database is called the Asia-Pacific Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements Database
(APTIAD) and is available at <www.unescap.org/tid/pta%5Fapp/>.  Its current coverage
will be expanded to include trade flows and the development of indicators to assess the
implications of RTAs/BTAs on such flows.
APTIAD has a searchable function that, when fully developed, will contain:
(a) Detailed descriptive and up-to-date information on the provisions of bilateral
and regional agreements;
(b) Statistical data on trade flows, commodity composition and services trade
(where available) by individual agreements;
(c) Selected indicators of performance of individual agreements for pre-defined
periods.
The first phase in developing this database has been completed.17 The current
phase is focusing on the following:
(a) Adding information related to the coverage of each agreement (contingent
protection, standards, services and other areas) by each agreement;
(b) Testing online use of the database;
(c) Developing statistical data sets related to each agreement;
(d) Developing analytical measures and indicators for tracking and assessing
PTA performance in various dimensions, and preparing the results for online
presentation.
Indicators of PTA performance will be useful not only for assessing PTAs already
in force, but also in providing insights into the potential outcomes of proposed agreements.
This information will be used to set out best practices that could be consulted by ESCAP
members when considering the negotiation of a PTA.  Ultimately, the database will provide
the information and analytical basis for work on designing a modal trade agreement for
developing countries, using existing agreements and their performance.  The principles to
be included in such a “blueprint” are:
17 The current version (available on CD and online) encompasses close to 100 agreements.  It covers all the
agreements reported to WTO to date, in which at least one party is in the ESCAP region.  It also includes other
agreements that have not been notified but for which there is official information readily available as well as
those agreements under negotiation for which there has been at least a first formal negotiation round.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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(a) Compliance with article XXIV of GATT and article C of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services;
(b) Coverage of the so-called WTO+ areas (competition, government
procurement and investment);
(c) The choice of partners with the aim of maximizing own trade creation and
minimizing the trade diversion of others, reluctance to act upon special
interest group pressures and reliance on research and evidence-based
policymaking.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper is a tour d’horizon of some of the remaining and emerging issues in
agricultural trade liberalization at all levels and is not intended to be an ambitious effort to
cover any of the mentioned issues in a conclusive and comprehensive way.  For that reason,
any recommendations that could be derived from this paper would lack the unambiguous
support of theory and evidence.  However, it can be said that it is high time for all countries
to move from trade-distorting policies to those that do less harm to the trading system while
more effectively meeting domestic farm policy objectives that include the provision of
security and predictability for farming sectors.
In order to achieve such a policy shift, the creation of less diverse positions in
negotiations from the Asian and Pacific region would be helpful.  Instead of thinking in
terms of “friends of fish”, “friends of GIs” or “very close friends of services”, perhaps
a coalition of “friends of people” should be formed with the interests of the majority being
put first, ahead of those of special interest groups.Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2006
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